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Against the Received Wisdom:  Why Should the Criminal Justice System Give Kids a Break?  
Stephen J. Morse 
 Introduction 
 Here is the opening of the summary of an amicus brief in Roper v. Simmons, 
the 2005 United States Supreme Court decision holding the death penalty 
unconstitutional for all juvenile offenders. It was filed by, inter alia, the American 
Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law: 
 “The adolescent’s mind works differently from ours. Parents know it. This 
Court [the United States Supreme Court] has said it. Legislatures have 
presumed it for decades or more.”1 
As if to confirm this blinding insight, Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Miller v. 
Alabama, the case that found mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile offenders 
who had committed homicide crimes unconstitutional, said, “…teenagers are less 
mature, less responsible and less fixed in their ways than adults—not that a 
Supreme Court case was needed to establish that.”2  
 Precisely.  The common law of immaturity in a wide variety of criminal and 
civil contexts and the establishment of a juvenile court system in the 19th C. 
confirm that the law has long responded to the psychological differences between 
juveniles and adults.  Indeed, Roman law instantiated the difference and the 
English common law of infancy has its roots in the 14th C.3  The age of majority 
has varied from time to time.  In the mature common law of criminal 
responsibility, kids younger than 7 were conclusively presumed to be not 
responsible, kids4 7-13 were rebuttably presumed not responsible, and kids 14 and 
older were presumed responsible.  Today, the dividing line in the United States for 
most purposes is 18 and varies for criminal responsibility; in English law, the age 
of criminal responsibility is 12.  But the important culpability and competence 
differences between those older and younger than the dividing line were always 
assumed.   
                                                 
1 Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
at 2, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
2 Miller v. Alabama, (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
3 A. W. G. Kean, “The History of the Criminal Liability of Children,” 53 L. Q. Rev. 364 (1937). 
4 I would prefer to use a different term, such as minors or youths, but AC uses “kids” and so shall I. 
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 It was equally and always assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that those 
differences and the differential legal treatment that followed were based on 
differences in the capacities of the two groups, such as the alleged greater average 
impulsiveness of kids, which could vary according to the context.  Committing a 
serious crime and deciding whether to have an abortion are different behaviors that 
seem to require different capacities for responsibility.  Differences may be more 
important for some legal categories than for others.  Age is allegedly a good but 
imperfect proxy for these differences.  Virtually all important juvenile law 
scholars, such as David Brink, Barry Feld, Elizabeth Scott, Laurence Steinberg, 
Franklin Zimring, and a host of others agree.  This was, and still is, the received 
wisdom.5  Let us refer to this as The Received Wisdom [TRW], recognizing that it 
may have different forms. TRW has been substantially bolstered in recent years by 
increasingly sophisticated behavioral science that confirms substantial behavioral 
differences on average between adults and adolescents, many of which are relevant 
to classic responsibility criteria such as rationality broadly conceived, and by 
neuroimaging studies demonstrating that the brain’s anatomical maturation does 
not end at any of the usual legal dividing lines but continues into the mid-20s.   
 Arguing against TRW, Gideon Yaffe’s The Age of Culpability [AC], an 
immensely rigorous account of why kids should be given a break for criminal 
responsibility, suggests that everyone else has provided the wrong rationale for 
differential criminal justice treatment.  TRW is so entrenched that, to the best of 
my knowledge, AC is the only serious counterargument ever offered for giving 
kids a break.  According to AC, the reason kids deserve a break does not depend 
on different capacities, but instead is better justified on the basis that kids generally 
have much less say about the legal criteria for criminal responsibility, primarily 
because they do not have the right to vote.  AC argues that kids should be given a 
break because Yaffe’s reason-responsive view of criminal responsibility entails 
that they have fewer legal reasons to obey than adults and are therefore less 
culpable.  AC argues that age has political meaning rather than significance 
because it betokens capacity differences. 
 This creative and intricately argued volume has many interesting chapters 
that deploy original and nuanced arguments that develop AC’s theory of 
responsibility, especially the chapters on culpability and desert.  These are 
challenging and interesting in themselves and less (but still quite) controversial 
                                                 
5 This assertion is implicitly accepted in Gideon Yaffe, The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal 
Responsibility, at 28, n.8. Oxford University Press, 2018 (hereinafter AC), which volume is the subject of this essay. 
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than the argument about giving kids a break.  They should be read by all those 
interested in criminal culpability generally.   I suspect that this wider theory of 
responsibility is AC’s major quarry and deserves its own review. Nonetheless, the 
general theory is nominally in aid of the volume’s basic goal of re-orienting how 
we should think about giving kids a break.  Because the primary goal is re-thinking 
why kids deserve a break, this essay will therefore focus on that question. 
 The question for criminal law theorists is whether TRW or AC’s rationale is 
a better positive explanation and more normatively desirable.  AC’s argument is a 
labyrinthinely complicated.  Occam’s razor is dulled with every stroke.  It is so 
densely argued that a review that does it justice would be as long as the book, and 
perhaps longer.  This is unsurprising when one is seeking to upend the legal, 
scholarly and commonsense wisdom (or lack of it) of millennia by philosophical 
argument rather than by empirical disproof.  A great deal of heavy lifting will be 
necessary.  By itself, the intricacy of the necessary argumentation and the hoary 
countervailing history do not mean that AC is wrong.  But it clearly has the burden 
of persuasion on historical and methodological grounds.  In this case, I am not 
persuaded: TRW is a better fit to the data and furnishes a more appealing ground 
for giving kids a break than lack of say over the criminal law.  TRW holds that the 
law gives kids less say because on average they are less rational and experienced 
than adults.  Indeed, that is the response that virtually all people have when hearing 
AC’s argument. 
AC rightly and usefully notes that there are three independent positive 
arguments for treating kids differently: age is a proxy for diminished culpability, 
kid will be kids, and kids will grow out of it.  It also correctly observes that some 
advocates for TRW conflate the three.  Nevertheless, the proxy argument is the 
most common and important position.  After addressing a few preliminary issues, I 
therefore discuss AC’s negative argument against the validity of TRW, focusing on 
the diminished culpability claim, especially because the structure of the negative 
argument against the other two is structurally similar and because it is unclear that 
kids will be kids is a genuinely independent argument.  If the negative case against 
TRW fails, then the only issue is whether AC’s alternative is desirable.  I conclude 
by offering what I think is a benignly definitional argument that survives the 
negative argument and supports giving kids a break in the exceedingly unlikely 
event that the empirical assumptions of TRW are proven incorrect.  Throughout, 
my primary goal is not to take issue with AC, although it will seem that way, but to 
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offer what I hope are helpful thoughts about how kids should be treated in the 
criminal justice system. 
Preliminaries 
AC’s argument is ahistorical.  As the Introduction noted, kids have been 
treated differently from adults in civil and criminal law going back to Roman law.  
The difference in contractual obligations is a primary example.  The explanation is 
virtually always that kids have lesser capacities than adults.  To continue the 
example of contracts, kids are more likely to have bad judgment and to be more 
easily taken advantage of because they are less rational.  It is highly unlikely that 
kids may avoid their contracts in most instances because they have little say over 
contract law.  It is of course possible that criminal liability is distinguishable from 
civil duties and protections, but where the law seems uniform in differential 
treatment and for uniform reasons—to wit, some version of TRW—drawing that 
distinction would have strengthened AC’s case. 
It is important to clarify a point that advocates for kids who base their 
arguments on TRW often confuse.  Finding an average psychological or biological 
difference between kids and adults, even a big one, does not entail different legal 
treatment.  First, the difference must be relevant to the issue at hand, criminal 
responsibility in this case.  Second, even if the difference is relevant, it must be 
sufficiently large normatively to justify differential legal treatment.  The most 
egregious example of the first problem is the belief that neuroanatomical 
maturation differences between adolescents and adults entail lesser responsibility 
for the former.  Neuroanatomical maturation is not a relevant responsibility 
characteristic, however.  The criteria for responsibility are behavioral, namely acts 
and mental states.  The claim based on neuroanatomy is a category error. AC 
scrupulously and correctly does not make this mistake.  It says that neural facts, if 
they matter at all, only do so if they underlie a psychological state or capacity that 
does matter.6  An example of the second is impulsivity.  The Supreme Court and 
many others seem to think that impulsivity diminishes responsibility, but it is not a 
defense to crime and it would not be a standard mitigating factor in adult 
sentencing.  Consequently, there seems to be a relevance problem.  But let’s 
assume that the Supreme Court is right.  In that case, is the average impulsivity 
difference between adolescents and adults large enough to justify lesser criminal 
responsibility for adolescents as a class?  Maybe or maybe not, depending on what 
                                                 
6 AC, p. 20. 
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the legislature or the courts believe is the minimum for full responsibility.  Even if 
TRW is the best justification for treating kids differently, these two issues must be 
faced forthrightly without begging the question. 
AC addresses the proxy argument with a clarifying analysis of the costs and 
benefits of any legal scheme that is perhaps the most penetrating that I have read. It 
correctly recognizes, as all sensible TRW advocates concede, that the behavioral 
characteristics that are relevant to responsibility will be both over-inclusive and 
under-inclusive no matter where we draw the dividing line, at least among 
adolescents.  Some kids below the line will have the relevant responsibility 
characteristics and some adults over it will not, raising the possibility of true and 
false positives and negatives in decision-making.  AC cautions that any adequate 
policy analysis must therefore include a full assessment of all the true and false 
positives and negatives and cannot simply focus on the virtues of the true positives, 
as AC accuses the Supreme Court of doing in Miller.  Where, given our values, the 
age line should be drawn in any legal context, such as criminal responsibility, will 
depend on the full costs and benefits.  Nevertheless, because no proxy is perfect, 
there will be undoubted costs wherever the line is drawn.  We should recognize 
that no legislature will be perfectly able to do that full accounting.   After holding 
hearings and presumably listening to experts as well as pressure groups, the 
legislature will  be flying by the empirical seat of its pants.  Among “equally 
implementable” alternatives, to use AC’s phrase—and in this instance the age lines 
are all equally implementable--we can never be absolutely sure which is the best, 
nor should we expect such certainty.  As Bismarck observed, watching legislation 
and sausage being made are very similar endeavors.  Neither is much like 
developing armchair theory. 
Before turning to AC’s substantive criticism of the proxy argument, it is 
important to recognize what a false positive means in juvenile cases and its 
systemic effects.  A psychologically mature minor who does not really deserve a 
break according to TRW will get one, but that does not mean the juvenile goes scot 
free.  Instead the juvenile will receive diminished blame and punishment, but he or 
she will still be punished and often substantially for serious crimes.  Thus, 
retribution, deterrence and incapacitation in appropriate cases will be served, albeit 
not as fully as if the kid did not get a break.  But how much marginal retribution, 
deterrence and incapacitation will be lost with such false positives?  I do not know 
the answer and neither does anyone else, but would it be so objectionable if some 
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young people were not subjected to the full deserved afflictive imposition of state 
blame and punishment? 
The Negative Argument Against TRW 
AC’s negative argument, which it terms the “empirical dependence” claim, 
starts with an intuition Professor Yaffe believes is widely shared: even if the best 
behavioral science were to indicate unquestionably  that there were no substantial 
responsibility-relevant differences between kids and adults or even if there were an 
equally implementable policy with a better mix of gains and losses that would not 
give all kids a break, we would still want to give all kids below the age cut-off line 
a break.  AC concedes that a “no differences” finding is exceedingly unlikely 
scientifically; indeed the increasing accumulation of scientific information 
continues to confirm the differences. But if it turned out to be true, it would make 
no difference.  We would still want to give all kids a break.  AC confidently asserts 
that the proxy for culpability argument therefore must be false and that the true 
ground for categorically giving kids a break is to be found in some other rationale.     
With respect, I do not share that intuition, nor did all but one of the students 
in my “Freedom and Responsibility” seminar with upper division Penn Law 
students.  What AC terms “our implicit and unarticulated rational for giving kids a 
break”7 is perhaps not nearly as widely-shared at AC believes and empirical 
dependence is not nearly as problematic as it avers.   Average capacity differences 
are not a metaphysical or conceptual truth about kids of any age.  They are 
empirically grounded and could turn out to vanish upon further investigation. (If 
they did, would you believe the studies or your lying eyes?) As a practical matter, 
however, differential capacity is not contingent although in principle, as AC rightly 
argues, it is.  It is a safe prediction that these differences will endure empirically, 
so perhaps it’s too easy to claim that I would stop giving all kids a break because I 
know I will never have to face the possibility.  But I do not think that is true for a 
reason prompted by the second pillar of AC’s intuition: that we would not give up 
on giving kids a categorical break even if there were an equally implementable 
policy that had a better mix of losses and gains. I think such a policy already exists, 
however, individuation, and I would adopt it.  I will discuss it in the last section 
below, but under this policy some but not all kids would get a break. 
But for those who accept TRW and want to give all kids a break, will AC 
force them to concede that the proxy for culpability ground fails?  I think not.  AC 
                                                 
7 AC, p. 33, emphasis added. 
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begins by hypothesizing a not completely hypothetical scheme by which all boys 
under the age of 18 get a break, but girls only get a break if they are under 16 on 
the ground that girls mature faster and therefore do not differ from adults at an 
earlier age than boys.  AC concedes that no one knows if, all things considered, 
this scheme would be preferable in gains and losses to a gender-neutral scheme, 
but also concedes that it might well be better and says that if it is, TRW adherents 
should accept it.  AC assumes that most people would nevertheless recoil from this 
scheme, but if they do, it claims, they should reject the proxy argument or at least 
demand that it be supplemented.  After all, the state should not be inflicting blame 
and punishment according to some proxy if there is a superior proxy.  Gender is of 
course a controversial variable to use to improve the proxy argument, but it may be 
the most useful if one is aiming for accuracy and efficiency in identifying those 
kids who deserve a break.  AC gives other similar examples,8 but let us use the 
gender example because the argument structure is similar to the others.  That is, it 
seeks to identify every possible argument that might support the proxy for 
diminished culpability and then demonstrate that it cannot be right. 
AC notes that attachment to giving all kids a break might be irrational if a 
superior proxy were found, but tries to determine if qualms about the gender-based 
classification might be both rational and consistent with the proxy argument.  In 
another words, like the excellent philosopher that he is, Professor Yaffe puts 
maximum pressure on his own argument.  For example, appealing to more general 
bad consequences of a policy, such as discriminating against women leading to the 
perpetuation of negative stereotypes, misses the point.  Consequences are not all 
that matters to criminal liability: desert is crucial.  The aversion to a gender-
sensitive classification for criminal liability cannot be properly based on this 
ground if gender is superior for ascribing blame and punishment.  Another 
possibility is that gender-based classification would unequally distribute benefits 
and burdens.  But, as AC points out, even giving all kids a break does that because 
                                                 
8 Race is an example, AC pp. 37-38.  AC notes that if race did offer a superior classification, which AC strongly 
doubts, the proxy proponents would be committed to using it if the costs of false positives and negatives were 
adjusted properly to respond to the dreadful history of oppression by race.  AC concludes that it would nonetheless 
be unacceptable, which it claims is a powerful argument against the proxy argument.  AC also asserts that raising the 
rate of true positives would not be an improvement in this case.  
I have always thought that race, like death, is “different” and requires special treatment.  Even if the proxy, 
suitably adjusted, was superior in ascribing liability, we simply cannot use it.  The same arguments have been raised 
about evidence-based sentencing and parole and the prediction of future violent conduct for purposes of involuntary 
civil commitment.  Even if race would increase accuracy for those practices, there is near consensus that it should 
not be bused.  In criminal justice, there is not simply one value—accurate adjudication—that is at stake.  In short, 
this argument against the proxy argument seems unconvincing to me. 
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those defendants who are adults are apportioned heavier burdens than kids, and our 
society believes that is just because there is a genuine moral difference between 
adults and kids.  It follows that if gender classification is superior, then there is a 
moral justification for the gender inequality that is as sound as the adult/youth 
inequality.  Just blame and punishment are essential government functions, AC 
rightly notes, and doing it better should lead us to adopt the superior policy of 
gender-sensitivity.  AC completes its gender discussion by asking whether there is 
an exclusionary reason not to adopt the gender-sensitive classification if it is more 
accurate and suggests that if there is, that is why we must recoil from this type of 
scheme. It concludes that there is not such a reason because there are permissible 
contexts for gender-specific policies, such as TSA employees who must pat down 
passengers and because oppression based on gender is not a feature of criminal 
punishment.   
After showing why the objections to the gender proxy can be defeated, AC 
says this:  
…my point is not that all this shows the we ought not to give breaks to girls 
between the ages of 16 and 18.  Far from it.  I think the gender sensitive policy 
should be laughed out of contention.  My point is that the advocate of the 
Proxy for Culpability argument cannot laugh at it, but must instead entertain 
the serious possibility that it is more justified by the standards informing the 
Proxy for Culpability argument in the first place. This is an objection to the 
Proxy for Culpability argument because the gender-sensitive policy is 
unjustified even it if offers superior classification than the policy of giving all 
kids a break regardless of gender.9 
With respect, I do not think that gender classifications for purposes of ascribing 
blame and punishment are necessarily laughable, but instead are sometimes 
plausible.  Consider Section 54 of the English Coroners and Justice Act that 
Parliament passed in 2009 and went into effect in 2010,10 which replaced the 
traditional provocation/passion doctrine for reducing an intentional homicide from 
murder to manslaughter with a new “loss of control” mitigation.  If there is a 
“qualifying trigger” for the loss of control, a broader doctrine than traditional 
provocation, the question is what degree of control can be expected of the 
defendant.  Subsection1(c) answers that question as follows: “(c) a person of D’s 
                                                 
9 AC, p.39, emphasis in the original. 
10 2009 Chapter 25. 
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sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the 
circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D. 
[emphasis supplied]”.11  In other words, English law assumes, perhaps incorrectly 
but perhaps correctly, that sex is morally relevant to the degree of self-control to 
expect of ordinary people because it affects morally relevant categories.  Further, 
with respect, the final conclusion that the gender-based policy is unjustified even if 
superior, is simply an ipse dixit based on the potentially incorrect assumption that 
we think all kids should be an equal break.   
 AC’s assumption that we all want to give all kids a break is simply an 
assertion not backed by evidence and there is counter-evidence.  I do not think the 
proxy for culpability argument has been decisively refuted. 
 The AC Rationale for Giving All Kids a Break 
 AC says that the thesis of the book can be summarized by a slogan: “Kids 
ought to be given a break because they are disenfranchised.”12 The positive 
argument can be summarized as follows.  Kids have little say over the content of 
criminal law because they cannot vote, although they can influence the law by 
speech (if their parents or other controlling institutions allow them to).  Therefore, 
when deciding whether to violate a criminal law, they have less reason than adults 
to recognize, weigh and respond to the legal reasons not to offend, even if the 
offense is a clear moral violation.13  As people who can influence the law, adults 
are complicit in giving themselves legal reasons to obey and in the state’s 
treatment of them if they offend.  Because kids are not so complicit, they have 
fewer supporting reasons to obey.  As a result of the absence of legal reasons, kids 
are less culpable and deserve a corresponding break. 
 On average kids have much less say or potential say about the law than 
adults.  Of course there are many adults who have little say, and some kids who 
may have substantial say because they are the children of legislators or because 
they become involved in a public controversy, such as the issues of gun control in 
the wake of school shootings or of climate change.  But kids cannot vote, full stop, 
and adults can.  Moreover, parents have significant authority over how much their 
children can speak.  If culpability differences depend in large measure on how 
                                                 
11 After a very checkered doctrinal history of provocation/passion doctrine in the late 20th C and early “aughts,” 
Parliament was returning to the sex and age based standard of self-control the House of Lords had adopted in  
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Camplin [1978] UKHL 2. 
12 AC, p. 178. 
13 AC, pp. 72-3, discussing the modes of transactions with reasons. 
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much say kids have compared to adults, the culpability differences and the breaks 
owed must be very large.  The assessment of culpability differences and the breaks 
given in our system are not so large, however.  For example, after Miller, kids 
convicted of homicide crimes can be sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole although such a sentence may not be mandatory.  AC does argue that, all 
things being equal, mitigation is always appropriate,14 but perhaps the force of 
AC’s argument is that the breaks should be much larger than they now are.  After 
all, as every criminal lawyer knows, the more important question for most 
defendants is not whether they will be convicted, but if they will go inside, and if 
so, for how long.  The size of breaks matters a lot and deserved more attention in 
AC. 
 The last paragraph began with the empirical assertion AC adopts that kids 
have less say about the law.  This is not a conceptual truth and thus it itself raises 
AC’s empirical dependence concern.  Suppose we had some measure that 
operationalized a consensual meaning of “having a say.”  In that case, we would 
have a continuum comparison between kids and adults that could range from kids 
having lots more say by the influence of their speech to kids having essentially no 
say.  As AC discusses, voting is not the only way to have say, although it is very 
important.  I recognize that the two extreme positions are about as empirically 
likely as there being no differences in responsibility characteristics between kids 
and adults, but AC would have to concede it is a possibility and should consider 
what follows, but does not.  Consider the possibilities.  If kids have no say at all, 
then are they culpable at all?  If the answer is affirmative, then the 
disenfranchisement account cannot possibly be doing all the work for why kids 
should be given a break.  It at least must be supplementing TRW or something 
else.  The reverse is also true.  If kids have lot more say, they are more culpable on 
that ground than adults.  If AC still wants to give kids a break, the enhanced 
culpability resulting from say must be swamped by some other variable that 
reduces’ kids’ culpability.  Once again, the variable must be TRW or something 
like it.  At the least, even if AC’s disenfranchisement account is plausible, it needs 
supplementation. 
 The question is why disenfranchisement reduces culpability?  What further 
reason does the law provides beyond the moral reasons not to do wrong?  Juveniles 
are not prosecuted for regulatory, malum prohibitum crimes.  They are prosecuted 
for acts that are at the core of the criminal law: force, fraud and theft in the absence 
                                                 
14 AC, p. 204. 
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of a compelling justification, which are clearly moral wrong as any ordinary kid 
knows.  Of course, there cannot be criminal blame and punishment if there is no 
violation of a legal prohibition, and even at the core, law and morality can come 
apart, although seldom.  The state can only impose a legal punishment for a 
criminal law violation, and kids don’t have a say in what those punishments are.  
Nonetheless, starkly immoral behavior like homicide, aggravated assault, sexual 
assault, and robbery would be prohibited no matter who did or did not have a say 
in the content of the core of the criminal law.  Moreover, the threat of a 
punishment is alone a very weak normative reason not to offend among those who 
manifest proper “modes oftransaction with reasons” (AC’s somewhat ungainly 
terminology) compared to those underlying the claim that an action is morally 
wrong. 
 Even a kid understands what a punishment is, but because they have less 
maturity, less rationality and less life experience, they may not fully and properly 
weigh the moral reasons not to offend.  If this is correct, then it lends support to the 
proxy for culpability argument rather than the disenfranchisement position.  Kids 
are less culpable because they, or at least some of them, have diminished 
responsibility characteristics. 
 A crucial step in AC’s argument is to explain why kids are not entitled to 
vote, why they don’t have a say.   Suppose for example that the voting age were 
lowered to 14.  Would we now think 14-year olds do not deserve a break?  AC’s 
basic answer is that we do need an age of majority for voting to permit parents to 
influence the future course of the law by doing their best to pass on their values 
that kids will promote when they are adults and can vote.  The age of majority is 
when we assume that kids can now be trusted to exercise judgment independent of 
their parents despite being influenced by their parents.   
 As always, AC has careful, detailed arguments about this position, but it 
hardly seems parsimonious or even plausible as an account of why kids don’t have 
a say.  There is merit in the point about people needing to pass on their values to 
influence the future course of the law and to bind themseves to the continuous 
polity in that way.  Nevertheless, the more fundamental, common sense reason for 
parental control is that kids need guidance as they develop because they do not 
possess the rationality and experience to be sufficiently self-directive.  Parents 
have always had control over their kids and tried to inculcate their values, even in 
polities that did not grant the vote to the parents either.  Parents in such polities had 
no motivation to influence the course of the law, but inculcated values nonetheless.   
12 
 
The less developed capacities of most kids and the lack of experience of all 
kids are also more convincing reasons why they cannot vote until they have gained 
sufficient rationality and experience.15  Roman and common law and general 
parental practice grants kids increasing responsibility and holds them increasingly 
responsible  as they grow older not because they are closer to having a full say the 
closer they get to the age of majority, but because their capacities for rational self-
direction increase.  Once more, a diminished rationality or responsibility argument 
seems a simpler and more plausible explanation for the differential treatment of 
kids better than competing theories. 
 The Virtues of TRW 
 This section first provides a brief general defense of TRW on the grounds of 
coherence and simplicity.  Then it suggests a version of TRW that would guarantee 
a break to all kids that would not be subject to the empirical dependence argument.  
Because I am untroubled by that argument and by not giving all kids a break, I 
offer this version of TRW as a friendly amendment and not as a last ditch effort to 
save TRW.  Finally, I offer another version of TRW that is also not subject to 
empirical dependence but also does not give all kids a break. 
 Perhaps the greatest virtue of TRW is that it provides a satisfying and 
simple, coherent account that ties together sensibly all the different legal contexts 
in which kids are treated differently by the law.  It fits the data not only of the 
criminal law of juveniles, but of virtually any doctrine that treats kids differently.  
It is possible, of course, that criminal culpability is distinguishable from all other 
doctrines, but doing so would require yet another intricate argument.  This does not 
mean that the age of responsibility must be the same across all contexts.  For 
example, I consider the imposition of state blame and punishment such a grave 
imposition that I would happily raise the age of full responsibility even if kids 
could vote or make other independent decisions at an earlier age. 
 The clear intuition is that kids are treated differently because they have 
different behavioral capacities. AC is correct, however, that the proper task of the 
theoretician is to furnish a good argument to justify the intuition by showing that 
the intuition is a rational conclusion to the premises.16  Any set of arguments will 
be open to counterarguments, but as long as the argument itself seems a good one 
and leads to a sensible result, it will stand until decisively refuted.  In the spirit of 
                                                 
15 AC, pp.181-82, correctly concedes this.  It is also relevant to TRW’s argument for giving all kids I break that is 
developed in the next section.  
16 AC, p. 19.   
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AC, I wish to offer a TRW argument that conforms to AC’s intuition that all kids 
should get a break when charged and convicted of crime. 
 The major premise in the argument is that legally different treatment of 
classes of people concerning responsibility and competence in both criminal law 
and civil law depend upon relevant differences in behavioral capacities.  Here are 
some classic examples.  Some people with major mental disorder are excused from 
criminal responsibility, are legally insane, because their cognitive or self-
regulation capacities are severely impaired at the time of the crime (this includes 
minors who face criminal charges).  A defendant is incompetent to stand criminal 
trial if the defendant cannot understand the nature of the charges and proceedings 
or cannot rationally assist counsel.  A person may be involuntarily civilly 
committed as a mentally abnormal sexually violent predator if the person has 
serious difficulty controlling his sexual offending.  A person is incompetent to 
contract if the person lacks the capacity to understand the meaning and the effects 
of the words making up the transaction or contract, in other words, he lacks the 
capacity to know what he is doing.  To make a valid will, the person must know the 
nature/extent of their property, the natural objects of the property, the disposition 
that the will is making, and must have the ability to connect these elements to form 
a coherent plan.  It is important to recognize, however, that in virtually all cases, 
the relevant decision will be individualized and not based on membership in a 
class.  Minors are an exception in competence to contract.  Except in exceptional 
circumstances, they can always avoid a contract because they lack understanding.17 
 The question then is what behavioral characteristic relevant to responsibility 
do minors have that would justify a categorical approach and give all kids a break 
in the criminal justice system without regard to their individual behavioral 
capacities?18   The answer is that those who have not reached majority do not have 
the capacity to fully “own” and to fully take responsibility for their individual 
mode of recognizing, weighing and responding to reasons.19   The capacity to 
“own” takes time.  Anyone with fewer than 18 years of experience (or however 
many that a polity adopts) hasn’t had enough time to test his reason-responsiveness 
against experience.  Even minors with seemingly fully developed rational 
capacities lack the experience of self necessary for full responsibility.  Youth is a 
time when we are trying ourselves on for size and deciding what fits and what does 
                                                 
17 Two other notable exceptions are the imposition of capital punishment on minors and people with intellectual 
disability (mental retardation).  Capital punishment is categorically barred for those in these classes.  The reason 
given in both cases is differential behavior characteristics that produce reduced responsibility. 
18 I warmly thank Gideon Yaffe for extremely helpful, clarifying discussion of what follows, including noting the 
potential circularity. 
19 Fischer and Ravizza developed a similar idea in their influential work.  John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, 87-89, 210-14. Cambridge University Press, 1998.   
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not.  Sometimes kids are reflective about this, but most probably are not.  
Nonetheless, it is a process that always occurs implicitly or explicitly. In a 
profound sense, this process continues throughout life, but youth is when it is most 
important.  This is not an argument for a character theory of responsibility and 
excuse.  Like AC, I reject such theories.  It is a claim that a certain amount of life 
experience is necessary to have the capacity to take responsibility for oneself, 
especially time in mid to late adolescence when full formal rational capacities are 
achieved.  In a similar vein, AC says, “Parents enjoy legal entitlements the 
function of which is to entitle them to exert influence over who their children are 
and will become….”20  In short, minors are still becoming.   
 In a certain sense, this is a definitional argument.  Full moral agency requires 
that people have 18 years of experience because 18 years of experience produces 
full moral agency in virtue of permitting people fully to take responsibility for 
themselves.  In this case, however, I think the circularity is benign rather than 
vicious.  It is a normative and not empirical claim, although empirical facts about 
developmental psychology might well influence the age at which majority is 
reached.  Of course, at age 18 some people have more “ownership” of themselves 
than others, but our polity has simply decided that by age 18, all else being equal, 
everyone has enough to be treated as a fully moral agent. 
 Patricia (Patty) Hearst furnishes a good analogous, intuitive example of the 
importance of time in becoming responsible for one’s self.   Many will recall that 
the 19-year old heiress was kidnapped by a radical group, The Symbionese 
Liberation Army (SLA), and “coercively persuaded” while isolated in captivity to 
adopt their values, attitude and political agenda.  Hearst became a member of the 
SLA and assumed the revolutionary name, “Tania.”  Not long after becoming 
Tania, she eagerly and actively participated in serious criminal behavior, including 
armed bank robbery.21  Assume that she was genuinely coercively persuaded, that 
it was in no way up to her to become Tania, and that the time between that process 
ending and the criminal conduct was very short.22  Tania clearly intentionally 
acted, intended the criminal conduct, was not threatened with dire consequences if 
she did not participate, and suffered from no mental infirmity.  In short, the prima 
facie case was airtight and Tania had no affirmative defense of duress or legal 
                                                 
20 AC, p. 174, and see pp. 181-82, claiming that at the age of majority we accept that kids have sufficient 
independent judgment to vote. 
21 The definitive account of the case is, Jeffrey Toobin, American Heiress: The Wild Saga of the Kidnapping, 
Crimes and Trial of Patty Hearst. Doubleday, 2016. 




insanity.  Her rationality was fully intact.  Nonetheless, did she deserve some break 
for her crimes?   
 If you think Hearst deserves a break, I suggest that the explanation just given 
for why we might give all kids a break—the need for sufficient time to pass to test 
one’s reasons against experience in order to be fully responsible—does seem 
plausible for Hearst.  She needed to be in the world as Tania for some amount of 
time in order to own being Tania and to become fully responsible.  After some 
amount of time, she would become fully responsible.  We can argue as a normative 
matter how much time is necessary, much as a polity might put the age of majority 
at a somewhat lower or higher age than 18.  Of course kids are “coercively 
indoctrinated” by their parents, but they have a great deal of time as they mature in 
the world to test themselves, including their modes of reason. 
 Suppose, like me, you are unpersuaded by the “ownership” argument and do 
not want to give either Hearst or Christopher Simmons a break.  Is there still a 
good TRW argument for giving many kids a break and perhaps almost all of them?  
I think individualization based on rational capacity with a break for 
underdeveloped rational capacity or diminished rationality would serve well.  This 
was the approach recommended by the dissent in Roper and the majority in Miller.  
This underdeveloped or diminished capacity doctrine would be accompanied by a 
strong presumption that it should apply to kids that the prosecution would have to 
overcome in presenting its case. This presumption should do much to alleviate the 
thorny problem of not giving a break to those kids who really deserve one.   
Presumably, the characteristics kids lack should be the same as those we think 
adults possess.  For example, if impulsivity is a reason why kids should be given a 
break, then similar impulsivity in adults should be mitigating also.  But I do not 
insist on this.  Some adherents of TRW believe that there is not a continuum of 
rationality between youth and adulthood and that adolescence is a unique 
developmental phase.  Nonetheless, that phase does not magically always end at 
the age of majority and individualization could still be accomplished. 
 Difficult question for proponents of individualization are how it is to be 
accomplished as a practical matter and whether the costs of individuation are worth 
it if most kids do deserve a break.  Testing the relevant variables would be much 
more difficult than, say, testing IQ to determine if a defendant is intellectually 
disabled.  Commonsense, intuitive judgments are also likely to be unreliable.  For 
reasons like these, when I proposed a generic “diminished responsibility” 
mitigation based on diminished rationality,23 I suggested that the diminishment had 
to be quite substantial.  Also, these variables are likely to be arrayed along a 
                                                 
23 Stephen J. Morse, “Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility,” 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 289 (2003). 
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continuum at most ages, but I believe we lack the tools to individuate precisely.   
Therefore, I also suggested that there be a single class of those deserving 
mitigation.  In the case of kids, that would presumably be most kids.  I am open to 
various schemes concerning how much of a break should be given.  It could be 
uniform or there could be a sliding scale depending on age because older kids 
usually have more of the “right stuff.”  Because the criminal justice system is 
always balancing individual culpability and public protection, another possibility is 
an inverse sliding scale, with the size of the break dependent on the seriousness of 
the crime. 
 Individualization is time-consuming and expensive.  Is it worth it for kids, 
most of whom will probably deserve a break?  I think it is because I think some 
kids are fully responsible.  Christopher Simmons was presumably in this category.  
Nevertheless, I would limit individualization to only the most serious crimes that 
involve danger to persons, such as homicide, aggravated assault, serious sex 
crimes, robbery, and perhaps burglary of homes.  These are such morally wrongful 
offenses that even kids have the strongest possible reasons, including legal reasons 
given the penalties for these crimes, not to offend.  If such a kid is fully 
responsible, the kid should get the full condign sentence.  Judges and juries may be 
hesitant to conclude that a particular juvenile defendant accused of serious crime 
deserves a break, but the strong presumption of giving one should guide the 
inquiry and limit the number of cases in which kids who deserve break are wrongly 
denied one.  This would be especially true for younger kids.  All kids who commit 
less serious crimes should be given a break.  I include theft in this category 
because it is clearly wrong to steal, but the threat of personal injury makes crimes 
that do so far more heinous and the need for public safety protection is less 
powerful. 
 Conclusion 
 AC is a tour de force that must be read by everyone concerned with criminal 
culpability in general and by juvenile responsibility in particular.  Such a 
formidable challenge to TRW deserves the widest possible readership.  Even if AC 
fails to persuade, its arguments must be questioned and answered by those who 
want to offer a principled defense of giving kids a break. 
 
Stephen J. Morse is Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and Professor 
of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania.  I thank Gideon 
Yaffe for his collegiality and friendship over many years and for helping to make 
this review better. 
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